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Since the recent advances in the institutional perspective of economic development, there 
is considerable increase in the literature on the evolution of institutions. In this study, while 
employing the game theoretic approach, we explore the rent-seeking fundamentals of 
institutions. We model the manner in which the rent-seeking behaviour of state actors results in 
inefficiency of the institutional framework. The main focus is on the rents provided by the 
availability of natural resources wealth, foreign aid or corruption potential. By originating a 
framework where rulers, agents of the state, and citizens act endogenously, we show that the 
rents from these resources can be a significant constraint to institutional reforms. In order to 
come out of the bad institutions trap, the society needs to offer a substantial amount of 
incentives to the privileged groups. The focus is on two privileged groups, i.e. the rulers and 
the state agents. In most of the societies, these two groups have the highest bargaining power 
in the negotiations over the rules and institutions. 
JEL Classification: P48, P16, P14, O43, D73 
Keywords: Institutional Reforms, Natural Resources Wealth, Foreign Aid, 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Institutional framework has been one of the widely discussed topics in the 
explanation of cross-countries development gaps. Two points are common in most of the 
available literature related to institutions and economic success. First, institutions are 
collective choices and endogenous; and thereby, emerge, persist or change from the social 
interactions of individuals or groups. Second, the generally agreed conclusion is that 
societies which encourage the protection of property rights; exercise the rule of law; and 
enforce contracts efficiently prosper. In contrast, societies where the policies of 
expropriation prevail face a severe problem of underdevelopment [North (1981, 1990); 
Hall and Jones (1999); Easterly (2001); Acemoglu, et al. (2001, 2005); Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005); Knack and Keefer (1995); Mauro (1995); Dollar and Kraay (2003) and 
Rodrik, et al. (2004)].
1
  Theoretically, most of these studies regard institutions as social 
infrastructure that provides an economic environment within which economic actors 
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1Most of these studies assert that in order to understand long-run economic performance, it is inevitable 
to address the interaction between institutions, politics and markets. Institutions form the rules of the game 
within which both politics and markets operate and ultimately determine economic outcomes. 
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solve their allocation problems. Thus, institutions have a direct bearing on the incentives 
structure of society. Accordingly, factors accumulation and technological progress are 
only the proximate causes of development while institutions are the fundamental ones.  
Although it is unanimously argued that economic institutions such as private 
property, the rule of law, and contract enforcement are of primary importance in the 
realisation of economic development; there has, however, been lack of sufficient 
agreement on what determine the institutional framework in a society. There are a variety 
of opinions regarding the evolution of institutions. For instance, four different approaches 
have been prominent in the literature. They are the Efficiency View of Institutions, the 
Incidental View of Institutions, the Ideological View of Institutions, and the Social 
Conflict View of Institutions. The first approach is based on the cost and benefit analysis 
of institutions from social perspective. According to this approach, institutions appear and 
persist when their social benefits exceed their social costs. The second approach takes 
institutional change as a byproduct of some other activity.
2
 The ideological view takes 
ideology and beliefs as the basis of institutional evolution.  The final approach to the 
selection of institutions takes institutional change as a consequence of the conflict over 
the sets of institutions.
3
 
This paper, combining the social conflict view of institutions and the theory of 
rent-seeking, examines the situation where the rent-seeking behaviour of state actors is a 
significant constraint to institutional reforms. Based on these two theories, we present an 
argument that institutional framework in any society is driven by its distributive 
implications. Second, it is an equilibrium outcome, whether it is efficient or less efficient. 
The winners of the prevailing institutional framework are those who had the greatest 
bargaining power during its formation. In order to change the existing inefficient 
institutional framework, the winner of existing institutional framework should be induced 
to change their strategy to the new equilibrium. This may be achieved by providing them 
with the incentives in the new equilibrium. 
In this study, we develop an original model which contributes to the existing 
literature on three fronts. First, it studies endogenous institutional change taking agents of 
the state as a separate group besides politicians and citizens.
4
 Given their de jure power, 
the state agents can prevent institutional reforms if the reforms endanger or reduce their 
rents. Second, it presents an argument that the choices of good economic institutions are 
not only constrained by the non-democratic rulers (dictators); but, in lacking 
democracies, the group of selected politicians also places hurdles, provided that they 
solve their within-group problems of free riding and collective action. Third, windfall 
income to the society either from natural resources or from foreign aid affects the 
 
2 For instance, according to the approach institutions emerge as an unintended consequence of other 
social or economic interaction or as a consequence of historical accidents. 
3The detailed introduction of these approaches is given in Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu, et al. 
(2005). Both of these studies present an argument in favour of the Social Conflict view of Institutions by giving 
some historical data on European Colonisation and the comparison of North Korea and South Korea. 
4The introduction of agents as a separate interest group is based on North (1981). North (1981) writes 
―it is the agents of the principals who enforce contractual agreements and enact penalties and not always, are 
these agents perfectly constrained by their principals‖. The main justification that renders the agents as separate 
interest groups is that they are self-interested individuals with their own interests; and their behavior is guided 
by those interests. 
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behaviour of state actors. In the same way, the corruption potential or other forms of rents 
associated with state intervention shapes the behaviour of rulers and their agents. In this 
study, we want to show how these cumulative types of rents affect the uncoordinated 
rent-seeking behaviours of rulers and their agents; and what does it imply for institutional 
reforms? The rest of the paper is organised in four sections. Section 2 surveys some of the 
available literature that clarifies the issue discussed in this paper. In order to motivate our 
hypothesis, we provide some descriptive cross-country evidence in Section 3. In 
particular, this analysis illustrates the growth performances of selected economies, given 
their endogenous and exogenous characteristics. Section 4 provides a theoretical model 
that formalises the main argument of the paper. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The basic argument in the paper is that institutional change is driven by their 
distributional advantages and the state actors, in order to sustain or expand their rents, 
prevent institutional reforms. We survey two strands of the literature: theoretical and 
applied. On the theoretical side, we focus on studies related to the social conflict view of 
institutions, rent-seeking, and their possible relevance to state actors. On the applied side, 
we survey the literature related to the possible types of rents available to the state actors 
and their implications for formal institutions. 
 
2.1.  The Social Conflict View of Institutions, Rent-Seeking and the State Actors 
The basic premise of the social conflict view of institutions is that institutions are 
social choices and different groups benefit from different subsets of institutions. As a 
result, there is conflict of interest over these choices, and the conflict is won by the group 
with higher bargaining or political power. In other words, at any time and in any society, 
institutions which are favoured by the privileged groups persist. This approach, 
originated from Marx‘s theory of class conflict, is extensively discussed in the literature 
on the evolution of institutions.
5
 The theories of interest groups and rent-seeking become 
relevant to the evolution of institutions once we take into account the distributive 
consideration of institutions.
6
 
Rent-seeking meant to describe the resource-wasting activities of individuals and 
groups in seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of state; and the groups involved 
in rent-seeking are the corresponding interest groups [Tullock (1967); Krueger (1974); 
Posner (1975)].
7
 According to the traditional theory, rent-seeking arises generally due to 
the introduction of state to economic interactions; however, this is not the only setting in 
which rent-seeking may occur. There is trade-off between the social losses due to private 
expropriation (theft, robbery, piracy, war or disorder etc.), and the social losses due to 
 
5Marx‘s (1970); North (1981, 1990); Libecap (1989); Knight (1992); Acemoglu (2003); Acemoglu, et 
al. (2005); Ostrom (2005); North, et al. (2009); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012); Khan (2013) are the most 
notable works in the elaboration of the social conflict view of institutions. 
6This is justified by the fact that institutions then become the ultimate determinants of political and 
economic rights in any society. 
7The formation of interest groups and the issues related to their collective action problems are 
extensively discussed in Olson (1965). 
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state expropriations (corruption, rent-seeking, malfeasance etc.).
8
 Alternatively, there is 
some level of state interference essential for the efficiency of economic activities relative 
to stateless mechanism or disorder. Likewise, the traditional theories attempted to explain 
the rent-seeking behaviour of private groups or individuals who lobby or involve in 
illegal activities for attaining government transfers or other favours.
9
 However, recent 
research has shown that state intervention in economic interactions creates public interest 
groups besides private groups [North (1981); Acemoglu and Verdier (2000); North, et al. 
(2009); Grief and Kingston (2011); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)].
10
 
So in general, in a rent-seeking society, there are two types of interest groups, i.e. 
private interest groups, and public interest groups. The public interest groups are the 
rulers and their agents (military, bureaucracy and judiciary). The rulers constitute as a 
separate group. For instance, a dictator not only uses the state to maximise his current 
payoffs; but he often changes the rules with a rent-expropriation view for the future. His 
payoff does not necessarily imply simple expropriation of the private resources; rather, it 
comprises the overall institutional payments, including both legal income as well as 
illegal rents. Similarly, in democracy, the rulers use their constitutional power to 
maximise theirs as well as their supporters‘ payoffs. Again, it does not necessarily imply 
that they simply transfer the rents from the minority either to them or to the groups 
maintaining their majority; rather, they do such maximisation constitutionally. 
Alternatively, in order to ensure their future rents, they choose the rules that maintain 
their economic and political power. 
Likewise, the state agents, i.e. bureaucracy, military and judiciary constitute 
separate interest groups. They maximise their compensation package through their 
influence on the political and economic systems. Overall, this package consists of the 
salary paid by the state, any income (legal or illegal) obtained from outside activities, and 
the perks of their offices. We have substantial literature that highlights such behaviours of 
these groups. For instance, North‘s (1981) theory of the neoclassical state elaborate on 
how the agents‘ behaviour affects the emergence of institutional framework in a society? 
Similarly, Alesina and Tabellini (2007) argue that the rise of regulatory state has made the 
agents key players with regard to the decisions and execution of a large amount of 
legislation. In a slightly different version, Greif and Kingston (2011) argue that the 
enforcement of rules should be taken as an integrated component of the institutional 
structure.
11
 Thus, the theories of institutional change should embody the enforcement 
 
8The details of the Institutional Possibility Frontier are given in the Djankov, et al. (2003). In the paper 
titled as ―The New Comparative Economics‖, the authors give the possible social orderings for a society 
ranging from ‗Private Orderings‘ to ‗Independent Judges‘ to ‗Regulatory State‘ to ‗State Ownership‘. The 
authors give a detailed description of the social losses associated with each of these institutional structures. 
9For instance, an entrepreneur wishing to get the monopoly rights of a government regulated industry 
might pay the campaign contributions to politicians, or might bribe a bureaucrat or judge for this purpose. 
10For the details of the state and its contribution in economics interaction, see the neoclassical theory of 
state given in North (1981). Especially, it elaborately illustrates the instances and possibilities where the 
interests of the state actors may lead to the emergence and persistence of inefficient institutions. Similarly, state 
actors are part of the North‘s, et al. (2009) ‗dominant coalition‘ and Acemoglu and Robinson‘s ‗privileged 
groups‘. See also Grief and Kingston (2011) for the enforcement of institutions as equilibrium outcome. 
11Greif and Kingston (2011) argue that the view of institutions-as-equilibria focuses on how interactions 
among purposeful individuals create structure that gives each of them the motivation to act in a manner 
perpetuating this structure. 
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characteristics of institutions. So, unless we take all these groups into the structure of 
economics and endogenise their behaviours, it would be an incomplete discussion what 
Landes and Posner (1975) called ‗a romantic view‘ that the members of the agencies are 
the unique guardians of some mystical ―public interest‖.12 
Similarly, the private interest groups maximise their payoffs given the set of 
informal and formal institutions. In particular, the set of formal institutions reflects their 
interactions with the public interest groups. The basis of these groups may be land, 
industry, or simply religious/ethnic causes. Olson (1965) provides the mechanism that 
result in the emergence of such groups; and asserts that the size and the solution of the 
collective action problem determine the actual effectiveness of such groups. Since, in this 
study, we focus more on public interest groups, so the remaining population will be 
assumed as a single group for simplicity. 
 
2.2.  Rents in Societies, Institutions and Economic Development 
There are two types of rents that state officials can seize. First, the state actors can 
create or seize rents from their interactions with private individuals or groups, i.e. 
corruption or rent-seeking. The second source comprises the windfall rents like the rents 
from natural resources, foreign aid, or some other form of public funds that might 
exclusively be at the disposal of either the rulers or their agents. Regarding corruption, 
there are controversial claims with regard to its implications for economic outcomes. For 
instance, Mauro (1995) empirically concludes that corruption negatively affect economic 
growth, using cross-country data from 1960 to 1985. In contrast, Leff (1964) and Lui 
(1996) predict that corruption enhances economic success by avoiding bureaucratic 
delays. To reconcile these conflicting views, the dynamic effects of corruption need to be 
sought. In terms of static effect, corruption involves transfers from bribe-payers to the 
bribe-takers; so, it does not have a net social cost to the society. However, in terms of 
dynamic effects, corruption inversely affects the efficacy of institutions. Accordingly, 
corrupt rulers or agents will resist any institutional change that endangers this type of 
bounty either today or in future. 
In the same way, sufficient literature exists on the implications of natural resources 
wealth, and foreign aid for economic growth [Auty (1990); Sachs and Warner (1997, 
1999, 2001); Djankov, et al. (2008); Knack (2001); Brautigam and Knack (2004); 
Kronenberg (2004); Dalgaard and Olsson (2008); Khan (2012)]. In case of natural 
resources wealth, the assertions are not congruent. To some it enhances investment and 
productivity; while to other, it is a curse as it results in rent-seeking which hampers long 
run development. There are many case studies across the globe that confirms the 
hypothesis of the natural resources curse. For instance, resources rich countries like 
Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela are struggling in terms of their economic 
performances.
13
 However, there is little progress on ‗how it affects economic growth‘? 
Given the recent emphasis on institutions, in this study, we explore the argument that the 
 
12This concern is widely discussed in a paper titled as ―The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective‖ by William Landes and Richard Posner in 1975 and a subsequent comment on the paper by 
Buchanan (1975). Both argue that in the economic approach to politics ‗the judiciary‘s role is one of 
representing the under represented groups in the political process. 
13In contrast, the four Asian Tigers including Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are 
deficient in natural resources, but are economic miracles. 
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availability of natural resources rents weakens formal institutions which, in turn, 
transforms into underdevelopment. 
Foreign aid has the same intrinsic characteristics that natural resource rents have. 
Most of the studies have found negative impact of aid on institutions and economic 
growth. For instance, Knack (2001) shows that aid flows are significantly correlated with 
the worsening of political risks for external investors, implying deterioration of economic 
institutions. Djankov, et al. (2008) find that both foreign aid and oil revenues have 
significant inverse effects on democratic institutions. Brautigam and Knack (2004) 
reported that the end of US aid to the South Korea and Taiwan resulted in their reforms in 
1960s. Thus, the rentable resources have destructive effects on the behaviour of state 
actors. In particular, they encourage rent-seeking activities relative to productive 
activities.
14
  
The model that we present below is expected to highlight on how the availability 
of rents in the form of natural resources wealth, foreign aid, or corruption potentials 
restrict the motivations to improve institutional framework. It also elaborates on how 
incentives scheme could change institutions if properly offered and implemented. But 
before going to the model, we would like to see the descriptive cross-country analysis of 
natural resources rents, foreign aid, corruption, and their probable implications for 
institutional quality. 
 
3.  DESCRIPTIVE CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 
This section provides some cross-country evidence relevant to the issue in the 
paper. The variables of focus are those that directly or indirectly affect the compensation 
package of state actors. We highlight some countries where state actors have a handsome 
amount of rentable resources; corruption and malfeasance are common; economic 
performance is poor; and compare those with other countries which do not have these 
characteristics; and have achieved economic success. For this purpose, we choose Nigeria 
and Pakistan and compare them with Singapore and South Korea. The former two are 
economic failures while the latter two are economic triumphs.  
Singapore, a small country of population slightly higher than 5 million, is one of 
the four Asian tigers in terms of growth performance. It has a highly market-based 
economy which depends heavily on exports, including largely manufacturing goods.
15
 
Economic growth has remained consistently high—at an average annual rate of 8.25 
percent from 1960 to 2000. It has surpassed Canada, Australia, and U.K. in 1994, in 
terms of per capita GDP. In nominal terms, its total GDP is estimated at $194.92 billion 
with per capita GDP of $43,867 in 2010. Like other Commonwealth states, Singapore 
inherited the British model of governance. However, its institutional framework is widely 
known for its efficiency and competence.
16
 The state-led economic achievements make 
 
14For instance, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) argue that in situations where rent-seeking 
provides more lucrative opportunities than productive work does, the allocation of talent would be worse: 
talented and highly educated individual will be more likely to engage in rent-seeking than in productive work, 
with the adverse consequences for their country‘s growth rate. 
15For instance, the value of its international trade is higher than its GDP, making trade one of the vital 
components of the economy. 
16It has been consistently ranked high in terms of business-friendly environment by the World Bank. 
For instance, in 2012, it is ranked as first in terms of doing business. 
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Singapore a good case for studying contemporary reforms in governance and institutions. 
Table 1, in the Appendix, shows that Singapore has no rents from natural resources; and 
neither has received any foreign aid. Besides, public sector salaries and private sector 
salaries are almost at par in Singapore. Thus, the larger incentives to state actors 
combined with the lower windfall rents rank Singapore to have one of the efficient 
institutional frameworks in the world. This fact is evinced by its higher score on the 
institutional quality index, and its lower score on the corruption perception index.
17
 
South Korea, likewise, is another shining example of a market driven economy, 
ranking 14th in the world in terms of nominal GDP. In the 1960s, Korea followed the 
policies of export-oriented industrialisation and import substitution, leading the economy 
to grow at the rate of 7 percent per annum during the whole decade. Onwards, in 1970s, 
they transformed to heavy and chemical industrialisation; followed by significant 
liberalisation in the 1990s. Given the recipe of such policies, it has been one of the fastest 
growing economies. For instance, from 1962 to 1990, its per capita income increased 
from $87 to $5199; and its total GDP expanded from $2.3 billion to $220.7 billion. 
Export-led industrialisation has been the major proximate factor behind the economic 
miracle of South Korea.
18
 Second, the state actively intervened in the market, and took 
sufficient measures for macroeconomic stabilisation.
19
 Alternatively, the state-supported 
industrialisation transformed South Korea from poverty stricken, inward looking, and 
economically backward economy in the 1960s into a globally competitive economy by 
the beginning of 21st century. As is evident from Table 1, South Korea has been a country 
with limited natural resources; and, likewise, it has never been a significant receiver of 
foreign aid. The limited amount of rents combined with higher incentives to state actors 
are the most probable reasons for limited rent-seeking, and higher economic development 
in South Korea.  
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the 8th most populous in the 
world.
20
 It is characterised by larger ethnic and religious divisions. Additionally, it has 
been under colonisation; and has been endowed with enormous natural resources. For 
instance, since independence, the economy of Nigeria has been oil-based, providing 95 
percent of foreign exchange earnings, and contributing 80 percent to the budgetary 
revenue. After the independence, Nigeria was expected to have potential for higher 
development due to its larger human and natural resources. But unfortunately, after five 
decades, the performance has been dismal as far as social and economic indicators are 
concerned. With per capita GDP of $1222 in 2010, the growth performance of Nigeria 
has been truncated during various decades. For instance, in the 1960s, GDP grew at the 
rate of 3.1 percent per annum, followed by the growth rate of 6.2 percent per annum in 
the 1970s which was caused by the higher oil prices in the world market. In the 1980s, 
the growth rate was negative due to oil price slump and debt repayment; however, in the 
 
17See Table 1 for the details of data and table 2 for the definition of variables. 
18In particular, the growth of large scale enterprises ensured the economies of scale and the technology 
transfer. 
19For instance, it was often viewed as mercantilist economy as in the early periods of its 
industrialisation. It erected tariff barriers and imposed a prohibition on manufacturing imports, hoping that the 
protection would give the domestic firms a chance to improve productivity through learning by doing and 
technology transfer. 
20For instance, its population is 152.217 million. 
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1990s, the economy again reverted to the positive growth rate and grew at the rate of 4 
percent per annum.  
Two factors are probably shaping Nigeria‘s poor economic outcomes. First, 
Nigeria‘s rulers have been unable to diversify its economy away from its overdependence 
on highly capital-intensive oil sector. Second, in most of the history of Nigeria, the 
government style has been remained as autocratic, leading to authoritarian operating 
rules. Table 1 illustrates that its score on institutional index is 2.8 while its score on 
corruption perception index is 8.3, both indicating poor institutional framework. 
Moreover, the rents from natural resources in Nigeria are 35 percent of GDP; and these 
rents are further augmented by almost half a billion dollars of aid per annum. The 
corruption and kickbacks of state actors resulted in squandering of the massive amounts 
of oil revenues and foreign aid.
21
 Overall, lower public sector salaries combined with 
lower beliefs on meritocracy, and higher windfall rents are the most probable reasons for 
higher corruption, poor institutional framework and poor economic performance in 
Nigeria.   
Finally, Pakistan, like Nigeria, has originated its institutional structure from the 
British. Pakistan, though average growing country at the rate of almost 4 percent per 
annum since its independence, is marked by higher levels of poverty and income 
inequality.
22
 Pakistan though has experienced both democracy and dictatorship but the 
operating institutional framework in both forms of government has been authoritarian. 
Due to weak representative institutions, the state actors like the military and civil 
bureaucracy have been playing a dominant role in policy making and implementation. It 
has, on the one side, encouraged corruption and expropriation; and on the other side, 
capitalist developments have actually taken place under their patronage and close 
control.
23
 This fact is obvious from Pakistan‘s lower score on the index of institutional 
quality. In addition, Pakistan has been one of the most aid receiving countries in the 
world, getting almost 1 billion dollar per annum. Alternatively, foreign aid has created a 
handsome amount of rents to state actors.
24
 The availability of these rents and the lower 
relative salaries in public sector provide justifications for poor institutional framework, 
and higher prevalence of corruption in Pakistan. 
 
4.  THE MODEL 
Consider a two period economy, populated by a continuum 1+δp+δa of economic 
actors, each with discount factor β>0. The population of common people is normalised to 
be 1; and also, it is assumed that they are the majority of the society. δp is the fraction of 
 
21For instance, the 1996 study of corruption by the Transparency International ranked Nigeria as the 
most corrupt nation among 54 nations listed in the study. 
22For instance, according to United Nation‘s Human Development Index (HDI), 60.3 percent of 
Pakistan‘s population lives on less than $2 a day and some 22.6 percent are living under $1 a day. Also, the 
distribution of wealth is highly uneven, with 10 percent of the population earning 27.6 percent of the total 
income. 
23According to the rankings of the Transparency International in 1996, Pakistan was the 3rd most 
corrupt country in the world. Similarly, business opportunities have been restricted to selected people who have 
established good relationships with these two interest groups. 
24In particular, the grants associated with Afghan War and War on Terror besides the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) has added to this bounty. 
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politicians who are also rulers. Namely, rulers and politicians are synonymously used in 
this study.  Finally, δa is the fraction of agents of the rulers. As stated earlier, in this study, 
agents like bureaucrats, military, or judiciary etc. are used as a separate privileged group. 
It is the agents of the state who enforce contractual agreements, and regulate law and 
order in a society. But not always, are these agents perfectly constrained by their rulers 
[North (1981); Acemoglu and Verdier (2000); Alesina and Tabellini (2007)]. The 
individuals are identical within the same group; however, there is heterogeneity across 
groups. This assumption is sufficient to ensure that the groups act like a player. The 
society is decomposed in such a way that the politicians are the rulers; the agents are the 
functionaries of the government; and the citizens are the subjects.  
This is a two period economy, i.e. today and tomorrow. The individuals are 
risk neutral and their preferences are summarised by the following period felicity 
function: 
10,tca,p,ilγCu i,tii,ti,t   … … … (1) 
 Ci,t is the consumption of player I in period t. li and γi are the leisure and the 
marginal utility of leisure for individual i respectively. The subscripts p, a, and c denote 
the politicians, the agents, and the common people respectively. Each individual is 
endowed with 1 unit of time, which he exhausts in work and leisure. There is a single 
final good y, which is produced according to the following technology: 
 tytt LRY ,  … … … … … … … (2) 
Rt is the degree of the effective institutional framework in period t, while Ly,t is the 
amount of labour used in the production, which is supplied by the common people or 
citizens.  α is the share of labour in production sector; and as a tradition, it is assumed 
that α>0. The industry is jointly owned by the rulers and some citizens. The share of 
rulers is κ<0.5, in order to be closed to reality.25 Labour is paid at the rate of competitive 
wage rate and the net profits are distributed according to the respective shares. 
Accordingly, the wage rate is given as: 
1
,
 tytt LRw  … … … … … … … (3) 
Since, there is single good, so it is also assumed to be the numeraire. Alternatively, 
all the incomes are measured in terms of this good. The life time value of a player from 
consumption is measured in terms of his current income or consumption, and his 
expected next period income or consumption discounted at a positive discount rate β. The 
institutional framework is introduced through Cobb-Douglas technology and its 
production function is given as:  
 tt ARR  … … … … … … … (4) 
 
25In this study, our focus is on the countries which are natural resources rich, or which depend on 
foreign aid. In addition, our focus is on countries where political and economic institutions are so absolutist that 
they create enough corruption potential in the society. If we characterise the countries of the world by these 
characteristics, then the elite section of the society or North, et al.‘s ‗Dominant Coalition‘ is the minority of 
society.  
180 Karim Khan 
Equation 4 specifies the effective level of formal institutional order as a function 
of the effort by the agents of the state, denoted by A.
26
 The justification is that once the 
rules are codified or written; they are ultimately implemented by the agencies like 
bureaucracy, military, and the judiciary. Accordingly, the effective formal institutional 
framework must reflect the optimality behaviour of these agents. To make things easy, we 
assume to measure effort in terms of the time devoted to the improvement in or the 
maintenance of institutional framework. There is some status-quo level of institutional 
framework R0. This assumption is made in order to put restriction that A cannot be zero in 
any period. This assumption reflects that we avoid the state of complete anarchy 
deliberately. Assume that A0 is the level of effort associated with the minimum level of 
the institutional framework, R0. Similarly R  is the ideal level of institutional framework. 
We can assume, without loss of generality, that R  are the rules which are written in the 
constitutions; and they are optimal.
27
 So if at any time, the rules are less than R , we say 
that the rules are not efficiently implemented by the agents of society. Also, we further 
assume that at the ideal level of institutional framework, R , there is no expropriation of 
the state resources or assets by either the rulers or their agents. 
The agents are paid at the competitive wage rate from the government budget 
for the level of effort put forward in maintaining the institutional framework. 
Additionally, the maintenance of the institutional framework is financed through 
lump sum taxation, T, on citizens. The rulers exhibit their preferences for a particular  
set of institutions through their willingness to initiate reforms or to maintain with the 
status quo. Similarly, the agents display their preferences through their provision of 
the effort level to the maintenance of institutional framework. Finally, the citizens‘ 
preferences for institutional framework are represented by their reaction in terms of 
labour supply to the production sector. The reforms introduced today produce 
benefits tomorrow. This assumption implies that institutions have long lasting effects 
on development. 
 
4.1.  Descriptions of the Players 
In this section, we describe the objective functions of the players, and characterise 
their optimal behaviour, given their control variables.  
 
4.1.1.  The Rulers or Politicians 
The life time value function of ruler is given as:  
ppp lRP
RS
WP
S
V 





 )(
2
)(
2
11
11
0
0
 ... ... ... (5) 
0)(0)(  RPandRS  
 
26According to Grief and Kingston (2011), institutions as equilibria encompass the enforcement 
characteristics of formal rules. Thus, the actual prevailing institutional framework reflects the optimality 
behaviour of the enforcers. 
27At this level of institutional framework, the behaviour of agents is like that of the Weberian 
bureaucracy. In other words, the agents are the unique guardians of some mystical public interest. 
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Vp is the life time value function of the ruling elite which is the sum of current 
period payoffs and the discounted value of the next period payoffs. S, P, and lp denote the 
expropriation of rents from either foreign aid or natural resources, share in profits, and 
leisure respectively. Expropriation decreases with institutional improvements and profit 
share increases with it. Further, Wp is the share of the rulers accruing from the 
institutional framework sector, i.e. the difference between the government revenue and 
the amount paid to the agents. The payments to agents include both the wage and any 
other type of reward for their efforts. We make some further assumptions. First, each 
period, there is some fixed amount of rents, Z, either from foreign aid or from natural 
resources, coming to the country. Some of these resources are expropriated which are 
jointly shared by the rulers and agents in equal amount. The remaining part is equally 
divided among citizens. Second, reforms, once undertaken, cannot be reversed because it 
is costly. These costs may include either adjustment costs or the costs associated with the 
strikes or lobbying of the groups who are the winners in the prevailing institutional 
arrangements. As stated earlier, the expropriation and profit share tomorrow are the 
function of reforms introduce today. There is trade-off for rulers in institutional reforms, 
i.e. good institutions tomorrow implies lower expropriation but higher profits; while bad 
institutions implies higher expropriation but lower profits. 
Fors and Olsson (2007) define an excellent measure for expropriation, which is 
used in this study. According to that definition, the amount of expropriation at any period 
t that can be made, given the level of reforms, Rt, is given as:  
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... ... ... ... ... ... (6) 
Similarly, in the production sector, the profits are distributed according to the 
respective shares after the payment of wages. The rulers‘ share, Pt, at any period t can be 
written as: 
    tyttyttyttt LRLRLRP ,,, 1)(  … … … (7) 
Using the definitions, given by the Equations 4, 5, 6, and 7, we get the lifetime 
value function of rulers or politicians in terms of the effort of agents and labour supply 
supplied to the institutional and production sectors respectively. 
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4.1.2.  Agents of the State 
As defined above, agents are the functionaries of the government that comprise 
organised agencies like bureaucracy, military and the judiciary. In most of the earlier 
literature, their role is either taken exogenous to other groups in society or taken in a 
limited form of principal-agent framework. In contrast to the existing literature, our 
model is innovative due to two aspects. First, we take all the groups as endogenous in 
their decision making. Second, the endogenous behaviour of state agents implies that 
their cooperation or effort for institutional reforms depends on the implications of these 
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reforms for their compensation package.
28
 In other words, they choose their effort levels 
to maximise their payoffs. It is assumed initially that if there is any expropriation, it is 
jointly shared by the rulers and their agents. Second, agents have also the potential to be 
involved in the decentralised corruption.
29
 Defining the preferences of agents of the state 
over corruption implies that corruption matter for the evolution of institutions.  
Let X be the fixed corruption potential per period in the economy.
30
 We have 
assumed only decentralised corruption, so corruption is taken out of the incomes of 
citizens or 
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To simplify things, we assume that corruption income enters the value function of 
the agents in the similar way as the expropriation of the foreign aid or natural resources 
rents does. Then, it is obvious that the income from corruption declines with the 
improvements in the institutional framework. Using the given definitions, the lifetime 
value function of the agents is given as: 
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The first order condition of agents implies that the optimal level of effort or 
cooperation offered to institutional reforms by the agents is given as: 
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A
*
 is the level of effort that the agent would assert in the maintenance of 
institutional framework. The structure in this study shows that institutional framework in 
any society is characterised by the optimality behaviour of agents. So, the status-quo, 
A
*
=A0 is equilibrium outcome. For any formal institutional change, the change in A
*
 is 
needed. Thus, in order to induce more effort from agents of the state, incentives are 
needed to be provided to them. 
Lemma 1: The effort of agent is an increasing function of its share in institutional 
framework sector,, and a decreasing function of Z and X.  
Proof:  The proof is understandable by taking the first derivate of the optimal level 
of effort of the agent with respect to the corresponding parameters. 
 
28The compensation package includes both the legal income as well as the illegal rents. 
29Easterly (2001) defines the decentralised corruption as the type of corruption characterised by many 
bribe-takers with their uncoordinated bribe-taking activities. So, by the virtue of its definition, decentralised 
corruption is directly related to the agents of the state. 
30The corruption potential is defined majorly by the existing set of informal and formal institutions. For 
instance, the informal institutions like culture, religion or ideology determine the moral sentiments of corruption 
like shame, informal punishments etc. Second, the formal institutions affect corruption potential by defining the 
role of agents in economic interactions and the accountability procedures of the agents. 
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This result is very useful for the institutional explanation of cross-country 
development gaps. The result implies that the societies with more windfall rents like 
natural resources rents, foreign aid or with more corruption potential are expected to 
persist with the bad set of institutions. For such societies, a larger set of incentives needed 
to be offered to the rulers and to their agents in order to change the existing set of bad 
institutions. For instance, the incentives should be such that the expropriation and 
corruption are less advantageous relative to the legal incomes such as salary to the agents 
or the profits shares to the rulers. On the other hand, in societies where the history has 
provided them with the less corruption potential or expropriation level, good institution 
would emerge. 
Definition 1: Define θ as the rate of incentives that the rulers offer to the agents to 
bring about institutional change. For instance, if the rulers wish to have an effective 
institutional framework Rt in the society, the incentives to the agent of the state becomes 
θRt. 
 
4.1.3.  Citizens 
The citizens are endowed with 1 unit of time, which they exhaust in labour to 
production sector and leisure. Their maximisation problem is given as: 
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According to the optimisation of the citizens, the equilibrium supply of labour to 
the production sector is given as: 
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Lemma 2: The labour supply is increasing in institutional reforms Rt. Moreover 
for κ≤1, the supply of labour changes positively with the change in κ if the indirect 
institutional implications of a change in κ are larger than the direct effects of the same 
change that is  
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Alternatively, the indirect effect of κ on labour supply must dominate the direct 
effect of κ on labour supply for labour supply to respond positively to changes in κ. 
Proof: The Proof of the first line is obvious from the expression of the equilibrium 
supply of labour. The proof of second claim is given in the appendix. 
The first result follows from the fact that improvements in institutional framework 
imply higher wage rate and higher profit shares. In other words, improvements in 
institutions implies higher price of leisure which cause an increase in the supply of 
labour. The second result implies that for κ≤1, the indirect effect of κ on labour supply 
must dominate the direct effect of κ on labour supply for labour supply to respond 
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positively to changes in κ. When κ increases, there are two effects on the supply of 
labour. One is the direct effect which decreases the labour supply because an increase in κ 
implies that the share of citizens in profits decreases. The other effect is indirect, i.e. 
through its effect on institutions. This effect is positive because for κ≤1,  
0
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d  
that is institutions improve with the increase in κ, where θ is the rate of incentives that the 
rulers offer to the agents to bring about institutional change. The net effect is the sum of 
these two effects, which is only positive if the above inequality is satisfied. 
 
4.2.  Institutional Change and the Associated Incentives 
According to North (1990), institutional change comes about when changes in 
relative prices create incentives for individuals or groups to renegotiate contracts or 
restructure rules. There are three relevant interest groups with two of them having the de 
jure political power to bring about institutional change.
31
 Accordingly, we need to clarify 
their associated incentives with the institutional change. As stated earlier, the 
maintenance of institutional framework and the associated institutional change is 
financed by lump sum taxation on citizens. Now in this simple economy, the rulers will 
initiate reforms if and only if their life-time payoffs from the new institutional framework 
are, at least, as much as it would be if they maintained with the status quo. In our 
framework, this implies the following condition which we can name as the participation 
constraint of the rulers;  
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The details of the derivation of C1 are given in the appendix. The first two terms is 
the loss in income associated with the transfers from the rulers to the agents with the 
corresponding institutional change. The third term is the change in the receipts from 
expropriation while the last term is their corresponding change in profits. According to 
the setting, all the first three terms are expected to be negative while the last term should 
be positive. To put it in more concrete words, there is a trade-off in initiating institutional 
reforms, i.e. good institutions imply higher share in profits from the production sector, 
lower expropriation receipts, and a loss in terms of transfer from the rulers to the agents. 
On the other hand, the persistence of bad institutions or the status quo implies higher 
expropriation of rents, lower share in profits, and no additional transfer to the agents. 
Thus any type of institutional change will be initiated if the net benefits to the rulers are 
positive.  
In the same way like rulers, at the status quo level, R0, A0=A
*
 is the optimal level 
of the effort of agents. Now in order to improve institutional framework, more effort from 
 
31The de jure political power is the power which is allocated by the political institutions in a society. 
For instance, it includes the power of rulers and their agents, given to them by the constitution. See, also, for the 
details of different components of political power and their definitions Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
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agents of the state is needed.
32
 In order to induce agents to supply more effort, there must 
be some incentives associated with any effort level, A>A0=A
*
. Here we assume that for 
any institutional improvement, the agents is provided with some constant rate, θ, of 
benefits that is 
1RINCa   … … … … … … … (13) 
Incorporating this increment in the optimal behaviour of the agents, we would 
drive the best response function of the agents.
33
 This is given by the following function: 
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The only difference between A
*
 and A
**
 is the inclusion of θ inside the bracket, i.e. 
with the offer of increment, A
*
 increases to A
**
. Thus θ>0 implies higher level of optimal 
efforts by the agents in comparison with the status quo. 
 
4.3.  Equilibrium 
This is sequential game with perfect information; so it can be solved by backward 
induction. The ruler serves as Stackelberg leader in the game. He observes two things 
before playing his strategy. First, he observes the optimal effort of agents of the state at 
all levels of incentives. Likewise, he observes the optimal supply of labour at all levels of 
institutional framework. After observing the behaviours of agents and labour, he decides 
whether to initiate institutional reforms or not? 
 
4.3.1.  Strategies Sets 
The strategy of rulers is to either initiate reforms or maintain with the status quo; 
and if the reforms are to be initiated, then how much incentives are to be offered to the 
agents? To write it more formally, the actions of rulers are given by the function: 
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0 refers to status-quo and 1 refers to initiating institutional reforms. Similarly, the 
functional form of the actions of agents is given as:  
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Finally, the function of the citizens‘ actions is the following:  








  aac RQQRRR
1
1
1
1
00 )(,)(],[:  
 
32Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) suggest when agents are difficult to monitor, they should receive higher 
wages. So in order to reduce corruption and improve the efficiency of agents, the incentives for corruption must 
be diminished that can be made possible with higher wages. 
33 The details of the derivation are given in the appendix.  
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Given, these sets of strategies, we define sub-game perfect equilibrium for this 
game. 
 
Definition 2: The sub-game perfect equilibrium is defined as ―the strategy profile: 
 *** ,,* cap   
such that the strategies of the rulers, agents and the citizens are best responses to each 
other‖. 
There are various strategy profiles which can be in equilibrium depending on the 
values of parameters. Nevertheless, for any specification of parameters, the equilibrium is 
unique. 
 
4.3.2.  Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
Given any optimal values of A and Ly, such that the inequality C.1 in not satisfied, 
there is unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in which the players play 
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In the same way, for any optimal values of A and Ly such the inequality C.1 is 
satisfied, there is unique equilibrium for any specification of the parameters. In this 
equilibrium players play 
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The rate of incentives to the agents, θ, is determined by the maximisation problem 
of the rulers that is given by the following implicit equation 
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Given, the assumed functional forms, it is complex to derive the optimal level of θ* 
in reduce form; however, assuming that the conditions of Implicit Function Theorem 
(IFT) are satisfied, we can characterise the comparative statics with respect to the 
parameters of the model. To do comparative statics, we assume α=2/3. In most of the 
empirical literature on growth, the labour share in production is estimated as α=2/3.34 
Also, we assume that the shares of rulers‘ and agents in the institutional framework sector 
are equal, i.e. ρ=1/2. These assumptions are made to make things clear for understanding. 
The resulting comparative statics with respect to the optimal rate of incentives that rulers 
would offer to the agents are summarised in the following lemma. 
 
34See, for instance, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a detailed discussion of the most plausible world 
level of the labour share. 
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Lemma 3: For the optimal level of θ with respect to the ruler, it is true that 
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Proof: Given in the appendix. 
The change in the available rentable resources, Z, has four effects for the outcomes 
of rulers. One is the direct effect and the other three are indirect. For instance, when Z 
increases, the direct effect comes on expropriation which also increases. The indirect 
effect is through its effect on institutions. The increase in Z implies the worsening of 
institutions which, in turn, implies lower payments to agents, lower profits, and higher 
expropriation in future. So lemma 4.3 implies that θ* will decrease with the increase in Z 
if the loss in profits is smaller than the benefits from higher expropriation and lower 
payment to agents. This result is very important in the sense that the improvements in 
institutions would be prompted only if the importance of profits was higher to the rulers 
relative to that of the expropriation. The second result is straightforward; as an increase in 
κ implies higher share of the rulers in profits from production sector, which induces the 
rulers to initiate institutional reforms and offer a positive rate of incentives to the agents. 
Now, we summarise the results of the equilibrium in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: There is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in the game 
described above 
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It is such that if the inequality C.1 is not satisfied, then institutional framework is 
R0 and A=A0=A
*
 and 
 1
1
01, )(QRLy . 
If the inequality C.1 is satisfied, then A=A
**
, and  
  1
1
11,
**
1 )()( QRLandARR y  
It is highlighted how in economies with multiple interest groups, and having rentable 
resources, the incentives for institutional reforms diminish with the increase in rentable 
resources. Second, by taking the enforcement of institutions as endogenous and the agents of 
the state as a separate interest group, it is shown how the actual effectiveness of the formal 
institutional framework is shaped.  In other sense, it is illustrated that the prevailing 
institutional framework in any society reflects the optimality behaviour of the various interest 
groups in that society. In order to bring about change, the privileged groups need to be 
incentivised to change their strategy to the new equilibrium. 
 
4.3.3.  Efficiency 
What is the efficient output in this economy? The answer to this question is 
simple. We need to find the values of A that maximises the total output in the production 
sector. The output in the reduced form is given as:  
188 Karim Khan 


 11
1
)( QARY  
The value of A that, for a given values of the parameters, maximises the total 
output is 1. When A=1, the institutional framework in the economy is at the best level, 
i.e. R . By assumption, this implies no corruption, and no expropriation of natural 
resources or foreign aid. Using these facts in the expression for A
**
 implies 
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This is the level of θ that will induce the agents to offer its total supply of 
endowment to the institutional framework. θ** is decreasing with ρ. The intuition is that 
ρ is the share of agents in the institutional sector, and higher ρ implies higher rewards for 
the effort in the maintenance of institutions which serves as an alternative to θ. Similarly, 
θ** is also decreasing with R . The justification is that relative expropriation increases at 
all levels of Rt with the increase in the ideal institutional framework, R . Thus, the agents‘ 
opportunity cost of improvement in institutions decreases. As a result, little incentives are 
needed to induce agents for higher effort.  
However, efficiency can only be achieved if the incentives of both the rulers and 
the agents are coincided with the ideal form of institutional framework. In other words, 
efficiency requires:   
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and C.1 is satisfied at the efficient level of institutions, i.e. 
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This is equivalent to stating that the payoffs of the ruler at the efficient level are at 
least as much as it would be if the system continued with the status quo. The purpose of this 
discussion is to highlight the fact that in societies where the agencies are strong, the 
constraints to efficiency may not only be associated with the rulers; but also, these self-
interested agents might hinder institutional reforms. In this simple model, if C.1 (C.2) is not 
satisfied, the rulers would prefer to continue with the status quo; i.e. they would never 
prefer the efficient level of institutional framework as there are no associated incentives. 
Similarly, for θ<θ**, the agents would never offer the efficient level of effort. In general, 
when it is in the interest of those with sufficient bargaining strength to alter the formal rules 
will there be major changes in the formal institutional framework [North (1981)]. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This study is motivated by the previous literature that has emphasised the 
importance of institutions in the growth and development process. Especially, we have 
focused on the costs of incorporating state actors and their interests into the formal 
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sanctioning process. Additional motivation is given by the literature on the curses of 
natural resources, foreign aid or other types of rents that are associated with state 
intervention. Today there are many countries in the world characterised by lacking 
democracies along with powerful agencies. In order to create or sustain their rents, the 
selected rulers-cum-politicians avoid institutional reforms. Such reforms are usually of 
interest to the wide cross-section of society. In the same way, agencies, whether they are 
civil or military, are constraints to institutional reforms. There are various degrees of 
power that the agencies have in such countries. In some countries they are serving the 
interests of the rulers and, in return, are offered with perks and privileges. Yet in other 
countries, they are jointly involved in the expropriation of rents provided by the natural 
resources wealth or foreign aid. Their involvement in decentralised corruption is widely 
evidenced in many instances. In this study, we formalise these issues and provide a game 
theoretic framework which can explain the behaviour of rulers and their agents in the 
presence of such rents. Our model is innovative in showing that the availability of rents 
offered by the natural resources wealth, foreign aid or corruption potential instigate the 
rulers and their agents to persist with the bad set of institutions. 
There are three main findings of this study. First, it shows that the greater the 
amounts of windfall rents, i.e. the rents from natural resources or foreign aid, the lesser 
are the incentives that the rulers and agents have for institutional reforms. This can be a 
possible explanation for the persistence of underdevelopment in natural resources rich 
economies like Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico etc. and the most aid receiver countries like 
Mozambique, Congo Democratic Republic, Tanzania, Philippines, and Pakistan. Second, 
the incentives of state officials for institutional reforms decline with the increase in 
corruption potential. Alternatively, the larger the corruption potentials in a society, the 
smaller are the incentives of its state officials for institutional reforms. This finding 
supports the existence of underdevelopment in the corrupt countries like Nigeria, 
Bangladesh, Somalia, Haiti, Angola and some Central Asian Republics etc. Third, our 
model shows that, in order to improve institutions in countries with rentable resources or 
corruption potential, a larger set of incentives should be given to both the rulers and 
agents. Such incentives must be sufficient to make expropriation and corruption less 
advantageous relative to those incentives. 
Although the model discusses the endogenous behaviours of different interest groups 
in a clear way, we believe that several other aspects might be fruitfully analysed within the 
given framework. For instance, we have focused only on the impact of institutions on labour 
supply or profits. It can be extended to see the dynamic effects of institutions on capital 
accumulation, including both physical as well as human. In addition, an econometric analysis 
is clearly needed in order to understand the exact channels of causation.     
 
APPENDIX 1 
A.  Let  
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B.  The ruler‘s payoff from status-quo is given as: 
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While his payoffs, given the new set of institutions is given as 
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The individual rationality constraint, 0
01  pp VV implies that 
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C.  With the new set of incentives, the agent‘s maximisation problem becomes 
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As a result, the new level of effort after incentives is A
**
 and is given as 
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D.  Proof of Lemma 3: The first order condition of the ruler after he decides to bring 
about institutional reforms is given by the equation: 
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Given the assumptions on the parameters values, equation A6 implies that  
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Since θ* is the maximiser, so the denominator is negative by the definition of a 
maximum. The numerator is negative which completes the proof of the first part of the 
lemma, i.e. 
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This implies that the marginal effect of θ* is decreasing with the increase in Z. 
Increase in θ* implies improved institutional framework, which in turn, implies higher 
profits, higher payments to agents and lower expropriation of available rents. Similarly 
increase in Z implies lower institutional framework, which in turn, implies higher 
expropriation, lower profits and lower payment to agents. Equation A7 implies this joint 
effect must be negative for θ* to respond negatively to changes in Z. 
Similarly, to see the effect of a change in κ on θ*, we again using the implicit 
function theorem 
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Again by the definition of a maximum, the denominator is negative while the 
numerator is obviously positive for κ ≤1 which is the case by assumption. This completes 
the proof of the second part of the lemma. 
 
E.   Proof of Lemma 2: 
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Taking the first order of derivative of the optimal level of labour supply with 
respect to κ, we get the result 
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The first term inside the bracket is negative for any <1. The second term is 
positive because 0
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Table 1 
 Comparison of Two Asian Tigers and Two Developing Countries 
Country 
GDP per  
Capita RSP Inst 
AID (US 
Million $) CPI NR 
Korea, South 20756.69 0.500 6.620 91.265 5.012 0.012 
Singapore 43866.92 0.802 8.856 14.374 0.819 0 
Nigeria 1222.48 0.028 2.773 547.860 8.268 33.844 
Pakistan 1006.95 0.083 3.655 899.189 7.730 3.581 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; World Bank Governance Indicators; and Rauch and 
Evans (2000). 
Note: Each entry is the average of the available data as otherwise indicated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  
 Description of the Variables 
Variable Description 
GDP Per Capita It is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in current US $ in 
2010, taken from the World Development Indicators. 
Inst. This variable is a measure of institutional quality. It is based on the 
World Bank‘s Governance Matters VII [Kaufman, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2009)] and is the average of their three measures that is 
the average of the Government Effectiveness, the Rule of Law and 
Regulatory Quality. The basic purpose is to capture the effects of 
bureaucracy, judiciary and army etc. The original indices takes 
values from –2.5(poor quality) to 2.5(highest quality). However, 
here I changed the index for simplicity, which now in this study 
takes the values from 0(extremely poor institutions) to 10 (perfect 
institutions). 
CPI This measure is based on the Corruption Perception Index of the 
Transparency International and again the value of the original 
index has been changed for simplicity. In this study, the index 
takes the values from 0(no corruption) to 10(highest corrupt). 
NR This is a measure of natural resources rents, which  are the sum of 
oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, 
and forest rents, taken from World Development Indicator (WDI). 
AID Foreign aid is denoted by aid, represents Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and other official aid received in current US 
dollars, taken from the WDI, World Bank. 
RSP RSP is a measure of the salaries in the public sector relative to 
private sector and is taken from Rauch and Evans (2000), which is 
the ration of the salaries in the public sector and those in the private 
sector. 
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